Rupert has asked me to publish his rejoinder to the previous post in this blog, wherein I defended myself against his attack on Analytic Idealism. Here is his response, in the form of a letter, in full and unedited. I've added a link to it from my previous post.
Dear Bernardo,
I regret the tone of my remarks in my interview with Curt Jaimungal, because I greatly respect you and your work. I am influenced by it. I think your promotion of Analytical Idealism has widened the scope of modern philosophical debate and opened up questions and discussions that might not otherwise have been possible. I apologise for expressing myself in a way you found hurtful.
When I was speaking to Curt about your work, I was talking to him as if it were a conversation between the two of us. We had already had several informal chats when he was in London soon before our discussion. Unfortunately, I was not thinking about the impact of the conversation on people who might not know very much about you, and for whom my comments could have been misleading. If I had thought more, I would first have made clear how Analytical Idealism differs from physicalism, before moving on to say that your Idealist position also includes some aspects of physicalism and reductionism. This became clear to me soon before my conversation with Curt because I had just read you new book.
In the subtitle of Analytical Idealism in a Nutshell, you call it “the 21st century’s only plausible metaphysics”. This is a provocative claim, and it provoked me into thinking about the basis for your rejection of all other forms of idealism. I could only conclude that this is because you still share some of the default assumptions of physicalism, including naturalism and reductionism, as you yourself make clear.
On page 2 of Analytic Idealism in a Nutshell, you write that Analytical Idealism “embraces reductionism”, by which you mean that “complex phenomena can be explained in terms of simpler ones.” As you point out, simpler does not necessarily mean smaller, but in the context of biology, reductionism in practice means reducing organisms to molecular processes, and behaviour to the activity of nerves.
I have spent sixty years struggling against reductionism in biology, psychology and consciousness studies. In biology, reductionism has long ruled the roost in the form of molecular biology, focussed on genes and other molecules. This reductionist attitude has inhibited holistic research in developmental biology, animal behaviour, psychology and medicine by forcing everything into a physicalist mould, pointing down towards the supposed ultimate foundation of everything, fundamental quantum physics. In the light of my own personal history, your advocacy of reductionism made me think of your position as close to physicalism, in spite of you being an Idealist.
You also embrace naturalism. This is your own definition: “The phenomena of the external world unfold spontaneously, according to nature’s own inherent dispositions, and not according to external intervention by a divinity outside nature” (also on p. 2). In common usage, physicalism, naturalism and atheism are closely intertwined, and often treated as identical. Naturalism borrows its widespread credibility in the secular world from the prestige of physicalist science. I know that you distinguish Analytical Idealism from physicalism by making consciousness, rather than physical processes, fundamental, but as you yourself make explicit, you carry over several physicalist assumptions and attitudes into your brand of idealism, which is what I tried to summarize in the phrase “idealist physicalism”. I agree this is misleading, and it would be more accurate to say “physicalist-flavoured idealism”.
Our most fundamental disagreement concerns God. All believers in God, including me, are idealists in the sense that they regard divine consciousness as fundamental. You want to keep God out of science and philosophy, especially any kind of Abrahamic God. Espousing naturalism enables you to do so as a matter of principle. But even if you dismiss anything to do with Christianity, Judaism and Islam, Indian religions have plenty of examples of trinitarian or advaitic (non-dual) idealism. Moreover, most forms of trinitarian or advaitic idealism do not involve an external supernatural God intervening in the otherwise spontaneous running of nature. They are not claiming, as you put it, an “external intervention by a divinity outside nature”, but rather see divine consciousness as underlying and sustaining all nature all the time. The philosopher David Bentley Hart, for example, shows this very clearly in his book The Experience of God: Being, Consciousness, Bliss.
We agree that there is a need to move on from old-style physicalism. We agree that idealism provides a better philosophical overview. But I take seriously religious or theological idealisms, whereas you rule them out a priori by invoking the naturalist principle. Then the only form of idealism left standing is you own.
It was unfair of me to call your form of Analytical Idealism an armchair theory and I am sorry about this remark. I tarred you with the brush of other philosophers, but in fact you have repeatedly engaged with detailed scientific and empirical findings. You have also made some visionary suggestions for empirical research. In your book More Than Allegory (2016), you created a science-fiction type fantasy in which you envisaged experiments on psychedelics in which people were given intravenous infusions of psychoactive substances (“the juice mix”) that prolonged their altered states of consciousness so they could explore them in great detail. Subsequently, this experiment was actually carried out, using dimethyl tryptamine (DMT), at Imperial College, London, with some very brave volunteers. The results were published last year in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.
You and I are both used to controversies and recognize that other people sincerely hold differing views. Ideas develop through dialogue, and we have already taken part in a good-natured discussion which anyone can watch online.
I hope that we will be able to continue our discussions in a spirit of openness.
Rupert
© 2024 by Rupert Sheldrake. Published with permission.
Nice to see a kind reply, and a restart of the spirit of dialogue!
ReplyDeleteWell, he starts out genuinely contrite. 🤔
ReplyDeletePity it happened. You yourself also haven't always been a very respectful conversationalist Bernardo. As long as we aim at bettering ourselves, a sincere apology should be the end of it. And somewhat to Rupert's defense, it must be said (tongue in cheek) that the logical weak spots in analytical idealism are its arguments (or rather 'suggestions') for why mind at large isn't metaconscious in its own peculiar way.
ReplyDeleteThe burden of argument is on those who claim M@L is meta-conscious, in the absence of any evidence for it at all, and overwhelming evidence to the contrary.
DeleteBernardo, I agree with your assertion that M@L is not meta-conscious but I'm not familiar with any of this evidence to which you referred above. I also have not yet read all of your books, so if one of them in particular would be a good place for me to learn more, name the title and I will order it right away!
Delete- First-time commenter, long-time fan.
Well , I don't know whether or not "mind at large" is meta-conscious ; Bernardo develops arguments against it (in his books) ; but something could give arguments in favour of it , namely the fact that some NDE-people report a kind of dialogue/exchange with "the Light" ; in the same line (I commented it elsewhere) Paul Tholey (expert in lucid dreaming ) mentioned that some characters in the lucid dream seem to be "self-conscious" (at least they say they are !!) : if yes , then one would have a situation of a big mind in which dissociated subminds are bOTH meta-conscious....So , your impression about these 2 points ????
DeleteI took Bernado's comments on reductionism not the way it is understood in general scientific parlance but in the way all spiritual paths underline as a movement from complexity to unity. Not as the way Sheldrake took it to mean as reducing everything to its parts
DeleteI'm not really sure why he says your most fundamental disagreement concerns God. The portrait he paints of a trinitarian or advaitic God doesn't really seem at odds with anything you propose, Bernardo, though please correct me if I'm wrong. God and nature become largely synonymous at this level.
ReplyDeleteI concur.
DeleteMy experience has been that those who believe in “God” are unwilling to find that concept to be synonymous with anything else, and those who support Bernardo’s concept of “nature” are fairly adamant that they do not equate it with “God.” The very word has become anathema to me, given the atrocities committed in that name. Granted, the absence of free will associated with nature presumably has the same result but does not require the same obeisance nor active obedience.
DeleteI found this strange too. It seems to me that when Rupert speaks of the trinity, he is by no means speaking of an ontological primitive (or trinity of primitives) in the same way that Bernardo would speak of consciousness. He's more so speaking of it insofar as it is meaningful to us as a framework by which to understand the dynamics of reality. But that's not what the question of the primitive is about. It is about, as Bernardo would put is, "what reality is." The trinity exists on an entirely different level of analysis and can coexist perfectly well with consciousness as singular primitive.
DeleteListening to Rupert speak, I understand his argument to be that there two: form, and consciousness. But then also the third 'will' part or the 'breath' - the energy flow that causes things to happen. I think he was saying that therefore this negates naturalism, because there also needs to be an aspect of something causing something with this third 'will' aspect. Please correct me if I am wrong.
DeleteFor me it is important that Bernardo stays as scientific (and parsimonious) as possible, apart from the only “mind at large” or “consciousness” axioma. It is interesting to see people like Rupert Spira (non dualism) and Swami Sarvapriyananda (Advaita Vedanta) agree so much with him. To me that illustrates that the development of analytic idealism isn’t closed to those of a spiritual or religious persuasion.
ReplyDeleteAbsent in this rejoinder is an argument for why MAL should be meta-conscious. From what I’ve seen from non-theistic idealists in YouTube comments sections, is criticism of analytic idealisms assertion that we can make any claims about what lies beyond the dashboard, since all we ever have access to is the dashboard. But I take it analytic idealism relies on Schopenhauer’s critique of Kant that we do, in fact, have some access to a world beyond representation?
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ReplyDeleteKen, that makes sense. I think the criticism I see frequently is that we can’t get beyond our representations, so it’s inflationary to make any ontic assertions about what lies beyond the dashboard. The individuals I see making these criticisms are generally sympathetic to idealism, but seem to argue we cannot rationally get beyond solipsism. I don’t necessarily agree with this, as solipsism seems absurd, but was more curious about Schopenhauer and Bernardo handle this criticism.
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DeleteThe dashboard idea rings similar to Dennett's homunculus fallacy. I wonder what Bernardo's take on this is. "Who" or "what" exactly is the witness of the dashboard? You could say the "dissociated self of Nature" is, but I wonder if there's any other possible answer.
DeleteThe homunculus fallacy is about finding a physical subset of the brain that experiences consciousness. Dennett has shown that this is not how we should understand consciousness under materialism. Something similar applies here: it's an error to think of the dashboard as something outside consciousness that consciousness watches; it carries the metaphor beyond its intended applicability. There is only subjectivity. All experiences are excitations of this subjectivity, including the experiences of the 'dashboard.' The metaphor is applicable only insofar as the experiences we call perceptions are encoded representations of other experiential states out there in the world. But they are still excitations of the subject that looks at the world.
DeleteSo what you're saying is that there is subjectivity and among the properties of subjectivity there is something which we can label as "the screen of perceptions" which is the experience of that subjectivity of its perceptual phenomenology (which can then be meta-cognized and re-represented, for example we can talk with voice about visual images - voice metarepresents visual images). What bothers me is that it seems like everything is a representation - pain in my gut is a representation of the fact that the gut's muscles are stretched (although here you can argue that the stretch of the gut is how pain in the gut looks like).
DeleteThis thing about everything being a representation has been bothering me for quite some time and I think the topic came in your discussion with Susan Blackmore as well.
A thought is not a dashboard representation. An emotion, an intuition, a fantasy, aren't either. Only perceptions are dashboard representations, no endogenous experiential states. My books are pretty clear and explicit in this regard, I can't hope to do a better job in a website comment.
DeleteKen, that is an excellent question. It seems that if one is agnostic regarding the ontic nature of the noumena, by default it implicitly makes them a dual aspect monist, or at least a dualist. So the agnostic would have the burden of explaining how an ontologically distinct substance could cause and interact with the representations.
DeleteI requested this explanation of one of the aforementioned criticizers of analytic idealism, and did not get an answer. Perhaps that’s telling,
I have read the books (not all, but I'm getting there) but I still think there's an issue with so-called endogenous states. In principle, I can connect the brain differently and instead of feeling the emotion of fear when I see a lion, I feed some other input into the same neural network (into the amygdala) and I will feel fear (the same emotion) when I feel hunger, let's say - the neurons will be connected in such a way that the feeling of hunger (or anything else you can imagine) is followed immediately by the feeling of fear. After I discover the neural correlates, I can in principle attach the neurons in such a way that any input I want will produce any emotion I want. I can even artificially generate "endogenous states" by discovering the neural correlates of love, let's say, and stimulating the same exact neurons artificially through optogenetics or similar techniques. As far as that mind is concerned, it will feel exactly the same and it will say "I am in love".
DeleteThat's why it's also not clear to me where the Markov blanket is, since we can replace the entire body with artificial stimuli in the right places, in principle, so the body can't be the Markov blanket. The Markov blanket has to be "somewhere" in the brain/central nervous system.
I think we should put the link to the Imperial College London study, it's this one if I'm not mistaken: https://www.imperial.ac.uk/news/243893/advanced-brain-imaging-study-hints-dmt
ReplyDeleteBy the way, the study from Imperial College London mentions "increased connectivity", not a reduction in brain activity. Here's the quote:
ReplyDelete"The fMRI scans found changes to activity within and between brain regions in volunteers under the influence of DMT. Effects included increased connectivity across the brain, with more communication between different areas and systems. These phenomena, termed ‘network disintegration and desegregation’ and increased ‘global functional connectivity’, align with previous studies with other psychedelics. The changes to activity were most prominent in brain areas linked with ‘higher level’, human-specific functions, such as imagination."
There's even a picture with a model of the brain having increased activity.
Raptor, if I’m not mistaken, Bernardo has a relatively large segment in his new book breaking down what “increased connectivity” really means and how it’s misleading.
DeleteYes, I'm not sure if this is exactly the same study that has been mis-interpreted. But there are a lot of details in it and it's not very clear what is meant by each term and also what we really mean by "brain activity". Do we mean increased metabolism? Do we mean increased numbers of action potentials in the neurons? You can interpred "brain activity" in lots of ways and then decide to use the term in whichever way it fits your preconceived ideas.
DeleteRupert’s “physicalist-flavoured idealism” is witty, but still not fair. Fairer would be “science-flavoured idealism”.
ReplyDeleteAs someone who highly respects both men I find myself very glad that Rupert has written this 'letter of apology' to Bernardo.
ReplyDeleteWhen I watched the Curt Jaimungal video I was more than a little shocked by Rupert's apparent flippancy, condescension and mischaracterisation of Bernardo's position(s).
As another commenter has already noted, while polite, Bernardo himself is rarely bashful about expressing his viewpoints and perhaps something was said somewhere which riled Rupert up the wrong way. Everyone has bad days... apparently even geniuses.
What really gets me is how Rupert - someone who had several dialogues with Jiddu Krishnamurti and David Bohm - is so mentally wedded to Christianity. While on the surface he seems to realise its historical and allegorical foundations are really no different from any of the other great religions out there, I still get the overriding feeling that under his sober, scientific facade, he is a literalist at heart. If I'm correct in this, then Bernardo's cold analytic idealism probably touches a nerve.
At any rate, I hope this unpleasant incident hasn't irrevocably tarnished the relationship between them. The fact that Rupert has issued this rejoinder, and Bernardo has published it, gives me a modicum of optimism.
Great to see an apology from Rupert but I'm still disappointed with the way in which, even in this rejoinder, he is overconfident in his statements of what he thinks Bernado believes. As with all of Bernado's interlocutor's I've heard so far, he doesn't seem to have done a deep enough study of anayltical idealism to be in a position to make any robust criticims. @Bernado, if you read this, I would welcome any pointers to constructive criticism of your work which you feel hits the mark in terms of rigour and depth to warrant serious reflection on your part. Having studied most of your corpus of work and 'lived into it' for a few years now, that is the kind of material I would value reading or listening to deepen my own understanding. Thanks.
ReplyDeleteThis was a great clarification and apology from Rupert.
ReplyDeleteI am curious about something. Rupert said this: "On page 2 of Analytic Idealism in a Nutshell, you write that Analytical Idealism “embraces reductionism”, by which you mean that “complex phenomena can be explained in terms of simpler ones.” As you point out, simpler does not necessarily mean smaller, but in the context of biology, reductionism in practice means reducing organisms to molecular processes, and behaviour to the activity of nerves."
I think in this section, Rupert overstates your "commitment" to reductionism, as you have written about the value of holism in other books. Not only this, but there is an undercurrent in Rupert's comments on your work of interpreting your view as overly "scientific" and not amenable to accommodate other religious views. However, this is untrue, as in "Why Materialism is Baloney", you admit the possibility that there could be some form of soul under idealism (i.e., a deeper egoic loop that is less dissociated and which survives the death of the "physical" body). I wonder how deeply has he read your work, because to me, your view is pretty accommodating to a lot of religious and spiritual traditions, including animism, Christianity, Buddhism, Taoism, and others.
As I was reading this correspondence, I was wondering if the ‘god disagreement’ was simply a matter of semantics, where Rupert’s God and Bernardo’s Nature (Mind-at-Large) are essentially synonymous.
ReplyDeleteBut, there is, I think, a crucial difference, in that Rupert’s Abrahamic God is often assumed to possess meta-consciousness, as evident in the ability to judge moral virtue. While ‘acts’ may, in theory, be algorithmically and objectively determined as ’good’ or ‘evil’, could the content of one’s inner self (or soul, to use religious language) be judged against the ideal ‘good soul’ in the absence of meta-conscious contemplation?
If I read Bernardo correctly, he argues that nature is spontaneous, instinctive, but vitally not meta-conscious. There is no intrinsic notion of good and evil (which is more akin to some Eastern traditions, although I don’t know enough about these to make confident assertions). Bernardo has also suggested that perhaps the meta-conscious capabilities that have evolved in creatures like us are, in effect, nature’s conscience; that is to say, dissociated mentation that has the capacity to judge moral virtue is of great value to the wider mind from which it is dissociated. In effect, we are encapsulations of the evolving meta-consciousness of nature itself.
It seems to me that while Rupert’s God has an innate meta-conscious quality from which arises the ability to judge and contemplate the formation of worlds, in Bernardo’s Nature, meta-consciousness is an epiphenomenon of a more primal source; a simple field of subjectivity, devoid of qualities.
I do not understand why some people act as if they understand analytical idealism. Especially if they just read a book or thought about it for some days. I have committed to understanding analytical idealism as Bernardo proposes. I almost done with the online courses he has on Youtube, as well as some books, and papers of his. And I would not dare to propose that I have a solid grasp enough to non-constructively criticize it. Regardless of my education or work. Bernardo, I am sorry that so many misunderstand analytical idealism and still attack it with such vigor.
ReplyDeleteI agree with Sheldrake. Idealism without an absolute consciousness or ground of being is illogical. An infinite ocean of whirlpools cannot exist without an intrinsic (non-temporal) cause. Materialism certainly is false, but the attempt to explain idealism in a purely naturalistic, non-transcendental way, removes what is essential. It may appeal to atheists intent on striking down "god-as-spaghetti-monster-in-the-sky," and it may help move them a bit closer, but it misses the point. Mind is not consciousness. Universal mind is not universal consciousness. Death simply merging us back into universal mind (with all its pleasure and pain) offers no solace.
ReplyDeleteIt seems Rupert isn’t the only one going after analytic idealism these days. I’m reading James Cooke’s book, The Dawn of the Mind, and he has a section critiquing Bernardo. Essentially, he argues analytic idealism suffers from its own explanatory gap: “If brain cells, neurotransmitters, and electrical activity are all made of consciousness, then we still lack an explanation as to why their organization influences conscious experience.” This seems like a misapprehension of analytic idealism that Bernardo has addressed ad nauseum. Since brain activity is what localized conscious experiences look like from across a dissociative boundary, one would expect alterations of the image of the brain to affect consciousness, but that does not mean the image is the cause of the experience, as the image is an experience itself. Is this an accurate understanding of the rebuttal to this type of criticism?
ReplyDeleteI still have not seen any response from Bernardo to what I believe Rupert's core point was, namely that Descartes reduced three to two by removing soul from science, which created a whole new set of problems that people have tried to resolve by reducing two to one 'essence'. This creates another set of problems about how one essence diversifies constantly into the moving, changing world we live among. The problem of diversification can be resolved by returning to three-in-one movement as a metaphysical standpoint (ground of being), which is a core concept in many diverse spiritualities. I hope this will be addressed in the coming debate, without getting bogged down in religion or religious language.
ReplyDeleteMy bias is towards physicalism, but I have to acknowledge epistemological limits, and so I really cannot say much about ultimate causes. (We could be in a infinitely regressive simulation for all I know.) What I do find problematic is supernaturalism, and as soon as people start heading down that path I tend to part company. That said: I acknowledge that religion is meaningful to many people - whether it is factually true or not, and that says a great deal about its appeal. (I love mythic narratives such as Lord of the Rings, and I also do not believe in hobbits, Gandalf and Sauron.)
ReplyDeleteThe beauty of physicalism is that it does not require vesting any axiom as absolutely true, but instead is very amenable to being supported - or culled - by empiricism. The beauty of mythos is that the stories can be amongst the most meaningful to many people and peoples. The problem comes in projection by many of their mythos upon the physical universe. It easily becomes the kernel of individual and social identity and can be manipulated by unscrupulous cads who learn the arts of disinformation and propaganda. Even so, mythic narratives have inspired great music, art, moral philosophy, literature and architecture. They can have significant positive as well as negative utility. To the extent that mythos leads to the development of a responsible person who is charitable, kind, and who walks with a light step upon the Earth, I commend it. To the extent that it supports racism, sexism, cruelty and indifference, I condemn it.
I am intrigued by the idea that the brain may act as a reducing engine. That aligns well with evolution where the need for observation and action that is accurate and comprehensive enough, while also being fast enough, enhances survivability. Whether some type of proto-consciousness or conscious potential is a fundamental property of existence is not something that I have the means to validate, but I also won't dismiss it out of hand.
The idea that there is no proof that the M@L is not meta-conscious is subjective of course, but it is also wrong in the objective sense since there is proof, i.e., If I ask you a question here about something you experienced in the past, and you reply with the answer, how did that information appear as a memory to you? Whatever causes that memory to appear to you must be able to perceive and comprehend the question written here. Which means it must be conscious of the question because brain cells cannot read or understand or even know what human language is, what to speak of being able to read it. It must also be conscious of your desire for an answer, which means it must be conscious of you, your state of mind, and your needs and desires. It must also be able to then provide the answer as memory to you.
ReplyDeleteLet's try it right now to show you that entity at work. I will ask a question, when you see the question try only to be aware of your mind but do not try to answer, simply observe the question, and then wait for the answer to appear in your mind. What will happen is that you will hear the answer in your mind spoken as a thought. Ready for the question? Make no attempt in your mind to do anything but to observe the question and then listen for an answer in your mind, here goes: where were you born?
However our memory works, the thing that provides an answer, the thing that manages your memory, it must be conscious of and able to comprehend human language, both written and audible. Your memory as it works would not work without those abilities.
There are other proofs, e.g., how are thoughts created? Most people believe they create the thoughts they hear in the mind. But can you explain how you create thoughts? You can't because you are not creating thoughts, you do not know how. Whatever it causing your thoughts has to be conscious and intelligent, more so than you since you do not know how thoughts are created our controlled. You can perceive but you cannot control thoughts since your access is limited to what you perceive of that non-physical dimension. Another example, how are dreams created? In a dream you suddenly find yourself in what looks like the real world to you, the dream virtual world is far superior to anything we can do with computers--it looks exactly like our physical reality. Whatever causes dreams must be able to create virtual worlds in our sleep, worlds that impose themselves on you, where people will start to speak to you, etc. How is that possible without a conscious intelligence creating that such a perfect and far superior virtual reality to anything we can experience with technology? Can unconscious brain cells read this, understand human language, manage your thoughts and memories, at every second so you can understand what these words mean without any time lag between seeing this and their meaning being made available to you?
Why isn't it widely known or accepted than? Consider that if there is a meta-conscious entity, and it must exist or you would not be able to remember anything, ever, that would mean that entity, of which you are part of, it can reveal to you its presence when and how it desires, since it is the base of all other "minds." Which is actually not the actual reality, there is one mind, each of us is part of it, what we perceive as our control over our thoughts, is an illusion. That entity reveals itself when you are ready to accept its control.
A very neat experiential exercise, Vraja. But it does not mean that a Mind at Large needs to be a distinct entity from the physically embodied brain that is processing this 'locality in wholeness'. I have a background in neuropsychology and social systems healthcare. These are all about informational patterns. The feature of brain function that most people are not aware of is that it is all made up of feedback loops which are time-dependent. As soon as you start to picture the brain not as the isolated anatomically naked lump of jelly that flops around inside the skull shown in pictures, but as the most complex network of feedback loops imaginable at every level of its structure, connected into every level of the body through hormones, and into every level of the ecology through feedback sensitivity, then the informational patterning that is mind becomes a time-dependent process that transfigures matter from within. Mindfulness transfigures matter's core processes, and it does so in a triune process of relational repatterning called intra-connectedness. Mind at Large is actually re-enchanting physicalism from within. Try my Substack, TriquetraLife.substack.com/
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