Rupert Sheldrake's rejoinder

Rupert has asked me to publish his rejoinder to the previous post in this blog, wherein I defended myself against his attack on Analytic Idealism. Here is his response, in the form of a letter, in full and unedited. I've added a link to it from my previous post. 


Dear Bernardo, 

I regret the tone of my remarks in my interview with Curt Jaimungal, because I greatly respect you and your work.  I am influenced by it.  I think your promotion of Analytical Idealism has widened the scope of modern philosophical debate and opened up questions and discussions that might not otherwise have been possible. I apologise for expressing myself in a way you found hurtful.  

When I was speaking to Curt about your work, I was talking to him as if it were a conversation between the two of us.  We had already had several informal chats when he was in London soon before our discussion. Unfortunately, I was not thinking about the impact of the conversation on people who might not know very much about you, and for whom my comments could have been misleading. If I had thought more, I would first have made clear how Analytical Idealism differs from physicalism, before moving on to say that your Idealist position also includes some aspects of physicalism and reductionism. This became clear to me soon before my conversation with Curt because I had just read you new book.

In the subtitle of Analytical Idealism in a Nutshell, you call it “the 21st  century’s only plausible metaphysics”. This is a provocative claim, and it provoked me into thinking about the basis for your rejection of all other forms of idealism. I could only conclude that this is because you still share some of the default assumptions of physicalism, including naturalism and reductionism, as you yourself make clear.


On page 2 of Analytic Idealism in a Nutshell, you write that Analytical Idealism “embraces reductionism”, by which you mean that  “complex phenomena can be explained in terms of simpler ones.” As you point out, simpler does not necessarily mean smaller, but in the context of biology, reductionism in practice means reducing organisms to molecular processes, and behaviour to the activity of nerves.

I have spent sixty years struggling against reductionism in biology, psychology and consciousness studies. In biology, reductionism has long ruled the roost in the form of molecular biology, focussed on genes and other molecules. This reductionist attitude has inhibited holistic research in developmental biology, animal behaviour, psychology and medicine by forcing everything into a physicalist mould, pointing down towards the supposed ultimate foundation of everything, fundamental quantum physics. In the light of my own personal history, your advocacy of reductionism made me think of your position as close to physicalism, in spite of you being an Idealist.

You also embrace naturalism. This is your own definition: “The phenomena of the external world unfold spontaneously, according to nature’s own inherent dispositions, and not according to external intervention by a divinity outside nature” (also on p. 2). In common usage, physicalism, naturalism and atheism are closely intertwined, and often treated as identical. Naturalism borrows its widespread credibility in the secular world from the prestige of physicalist science. I know that you distinguish Analytical Idealism from physicalism by making consciousness, rather than physical processes, fundamental, but as you yourself make explicit, you carry over several physicalist assumptions and attitudes into your brand of idealism, which is what I tried to summarize in the phrase “idealist physicalism”. I agree this is misleading, and it would be more accurate to say “physicalist-flavoured idealism”. 

Our most fundamental disagreement concerns God. All believers in God, including me, are idealists in the sense that they regard divine consciousness as fundamental. You want to keep God out of science and philosophy, especially any kind of Abrahamic God. Espousing naturalism enables you to do so as a matter of principle. But even if you dismiss anything to do with Christianity, Judaism and Islam, Indian religions have plenty of examples of trinitarian or advaitic (non-dual) idealism. Moreover, most forms of trinitarian or advaitic idealism do not involve an external supernatural God intervening in the otherwise spontaneous running of nature. They are not claiming, as you put it, an “external intervention by a divinity outside nature”, but rather see divine consciousness as underlying and sustaining all nature all the time. The philosopher David Bentley Hart, for example, shows this very clearly in his book The Experience of God: Being, Consciousness, Bliss

We agree that there is a need to move on from old-style physicalism. We agree that idealism provides a better philosophical overview. But I take seriously religious or theological idealisms, whereas you rule them out a priori by invoking the naturalist principle. Then the only form of idealism left standing is you own.

It was unfair of me to call your form of Analytical Idealism an armchair theory and I am sorry about this remark. I tarred you with the brush of other philosophers, but in fact you have repeatedly engaged with detailed scientific and empirical findings. You have also made some visionary suggestions for empirical research. In your book More Than Allegory (2016), you created a science-fiction type fantasy in which you envisaged experiments on psychedelics in which people were given intravenous infusions of psychoactive substances (“the juice mix”) that prolonged their altered states of consciousness so they could explore them in great detail. Subsequently, this experiment was actually carried out, using dimethyl tryptamine (DMT), at Imperial College, London, with some very brave volunteers. The results were published last year in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences

You and I are both used to controversies and recognize that other people sincerely hold differing views. Ideas develop through dialogue, and we have already taken part in a good-natured discussion which anyone can watch online

I hope that we will be able to continue our discussions in a spirit of openness. 

Rupert

© 2024 by Rupert Sheldrake. Published with permission.

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30 comments:

  1. Nice to see a kind reply, and a restart of the spirit of dialogue!

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  2. Well, he starts out genuinely contrite. 🤔

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  3. Pity it happened. You yourself also haven't always been a very respectful conversationalist Bernardo. As long as we aim at bettering ourselves, a sincere apology should be the end of it. And somewhat to Rupert's defense, it must be said (tongue in cheek) that the logical weak spots in analytical idealism are its arguments (or rather 'suggestions') for why mind at large isn't metaconscious in its own peculiar way.

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    1. The burden of argument is on those who claim M@L is meta-conscious, in the absence of any evidence for it at all, and overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

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    2. Bernardo, I agree with your assertion that M@L is not meta-conscious but I'm not familiar with any of this evidence to which you referred above. I also have not yet read all of your books, so if one of them in particular would be a good place for me to learn more, name the title and I will order it right away!

      - First-time commenter, long-time fan.

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    3. Well , I don't know whether or not "mind at large" is meta-conscious ; Bernardo develops arguments against it (in his books) ; but something could give arguments in favour of it , namely the fact that some NDE-people report a kind of dialogue/exchange with "the Light" ; in the same line (I commented it elsewhere) Paul Tholey (expert in lucid dreaming ) mentioned that some characters in the lucid dream seem to be "self-conscious" (at least they say they are !!) : if yes , then one would have a situation of a big mind in which dissociated subminds are bOTH meta-conscious....So , your impression about these 2 points ????

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  4. I'm not really sure why he says your most fundamental disagreement concerns God. The portrait he paints of a trinitarian or advaitic God doesn't really seem at odds with anything you propose, Bernardo, though please correct me if I'm wrong. God and nature become largely synonymous at this level.

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    1. My experience has been that those who believe in “God” are unwilling to find that concept to be synonymous with anything else, and those who support Bernardo’s concept of “nature” are fairly adamant that they do not equate it with “God.” The very word has become anathema to me, given the atrocities committed in that name. Granted, the absence of free will associated with nature presumably has the same result but does not require the same obeisance nor active obedience.

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    2. I found this strange too. It seems to me that when Rupert speaks of the trinity, he is by no means speaking of an ontological primitive (or trinity of primitives) in the same way that Bernardo would speak of consciousness. He's more so speaking of it insofar as it is meaningful to us as a framework by which to understand the dynamics of reality. But that's not what the question of the primitive is about. It is about, as Bernardo would put is, "what reality is." The trinity exists on an entirely different level of analysis and can coexist perfectly well with consciousness as singular primitive.

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  5. For me it is important that Bernardo stays as scientific (and parsimonious) as possible, apart from the only “mind at large” or “consciousness” axioma. It is interesting to see people like Rupert Spira (non dualism) and Swami Sarvapriyananda (Advaita Vedanta) agree so much with him. To me that illustrates that the development of analytic idealism isn’t closed to those of a spiritual or religious persuasion.

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  6. Absent in this rejoinder is an argument for why MAL should be meta-conscious. From what I’ve seen from non-theistic idealists in YouTube comments sections, is criticism of analytic idealisms assertion that we can make any claims about what lies beyond the dashboard, since all we ever have access to is the dashboard. But I take it analytic idealism relies on Schopenhauer’s critique of Kant that we do, in fact, have some access to a world beyond representation?

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    1. Ken, that makes sense. I think the criticism I see frequently is that we can’t get beyond our representations, so it’s inflationary to make any ontic assertions about what lies beyond the dashboard. The individuals I see making these criticisms are generally sympathetic to idealism, but seem to argue we cannot rationally get beyond solipsism. I don’t necessarily agree with this, as solipsism seems absurd, but was more curious about Schopenhauer and Bernardo handle this criticism.

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    3. The dashboard idea rings similar to Dennett's homunculus fallacy. I wonder what Bernardo's take on this is. "Who" or "what" exactly is the witness of the dashboard? You could say the "dissociated self of Nature" is, but I wonder if there's any other possible answer.

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    4. The homunculus fallacy is about finding a physical subset of the brain that experiences consciousness. Dennett has shown that this is not how we should understand consciousness under materialism. Something similar applies here: it's an error to think of the dashboard as something outside consciousness that consciousness watches; it carries the metaphor beyond its intended applicability. There is only subjectivity. All experiences are excitations of this subjectivity, including the experiences of the 'dashboard.' The metaphor is applicable only insofar as the experiences we call perceptions are encoded representations of other experiential states out there in the world. But they are still excitations of the subject that looks at the world.

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    5. So what you're saying is that there is subjectivity and among the properties of subjectivity there is something which we can label as "the screen of perceptions" which is the experience of that subjectivity of its perceptual phenomenology (which can then be meta-cognized and re-represented, for example we can talk with voice about visual images - voice metarepresents visual images). What bothers me is that it seems like everything is a representation - pain in my gut is a representation of the fact that the gut's muscles are stretched (although here you can argue that the stretch of the gut is how pain in the gut looks like).

      This thing about everything being a representation has been bothering me for quite some time and I think the topic came in your discussion with Susan Blackmore as well.

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    6. A thought is not a dashboard representation. An emotion, an intuition, a fantasy, aren't either. Only perceptions are dashboard representations, no endogenous experiential states. My books are pretty clear and explicit in this regard, I can't hope to do a better job in a website comment.

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    7. Ken, that is an excellent question. It seems that if one is agnostic regarding the ontic nature of the noumena, by default it implicitly makes them a dual aspect monist, or at least a dualist. So the agnostic would have the burden of explaining how an ontologically distinct substance could cause and interact with the representations.

      I requested this explanation of one of the aforementioned criticizers of analytic idealism, and did not get an answer. Perhaps that’s telling,

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    8. I have read the books (not all, but I'm getting there) but I still think there's an issue with so-called endogenous states. In principle, I can connect the brain differently and instead of feeling the emotion of fear when I see a lion, I feed some other input into the same neural network (into the amygdala) and I will feel fear (the same emotion) when I feel hunger, let's say - the neurons will be connected in such a way that the feeling of hunger (or anything else you can imagine) is followed immediately by the feeling of fear. After I discover the neural correlates, I can in principle attach the neurons in such a way that any input I want will produce any emotion I want. I can even artificially generate "endogenous states" by discovering the neural correlates of love, let's say, and stimulating the same exact neurons artificially through optogenetics or similar techniques. As far as that mind is concerned, it will feel exactly the same and it will say "I am in love".

      That's why it's also not clear to me where the Markov blanket is, since we can replace the entire body with artificial stimuli in the right places, in principle, so the body can't be the Markov blanket. The Markov blanket has to be "somewhere" in the brain/central nervous system.

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  8. I think we should put the link to the Imperial College London study, it's this one if I'm not mistaken: https://www.imperial.ac.uk/news/243893/advanced-brain-imaging-study-hints-dmt

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  9. By the way, the study from Imperial College London mentions "increased connectivity", not a reduction in brain activity. Here's the quote:

    "The fMRI scans found changes to activity within and between brain regions in volunteers under the influence of DMT. Effects included increased connectivity across the brain, with more communication between different areas and systems. These phenomena, termed ‘network disintegration and desegregation’ and increased ‘global functional connectivity’, align with previous studies with other psychedelics. The changes to activity were most prominent in brain areas linked with ‘higher level’, human-specific functions, such as imagination."

    There's even a picture with a model of the brain having increased activity.

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    1. Raptor, if I’m not mistaken, Bernardo has a relatively large segment in his new book breaking down what “increased connectivity” really means and how it’s misleading.

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    2. Yes, I'm not sure if this is exactly the same study that has been mis-interpreted. But there are a lot of details in it and it's not very clear what is meant by each term and also what we really mean by "brain activity". Do we mean increased metabolism? Do we mean increased numbers of action potentials in the neurons? You can interpred "brain activity" in lots of ways and then decide to use the term in whichever way it fits your preconceived ideas.

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  10. Rupert’s “physicalist-flavoured idealism” is witty, but still not fair. Fairer would be “science-flavoured idealism”.

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  11. As someone who highly respects both men I find myself very glad that Rupert has written this 'letter of apology' to Bernardo.

    When I watched the Curt Jaimungal video I was more than a little shocked by Rupert's apparent flippancy, condescension and mischaracterisation of Bernardo's position(s).

    As another commenter has already noted, while polite, Bernardo himself is rarely bashful about expressing his viewpoints and perhaps something was said somewhere which riled Rupert up the wrong way. Everyone has bad days... apparently even geniuses.

    What really gets me is how Rupert - someone who had several dialogues with Jiddu Krishnamurti and David Bohm - is so mentally wedded to Christianity. While on the surface he seems to realise its historical and allegorical foundations are really no different from any of the other great religions out there, I still get the overriding feeling that under his sober, scientific facade, he is a literalist at heart. If I'm correct in this, then Bernardo's cold analytic idealism probably touches a nerve.

    At any rate, I hope this unpleasant incident hasn't irrevocably tarnished the relationship between them. The fact that Rupert has issued this rejoinder, and Bernardo has published it, gives me a modicum of optimism.

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  12. Great to see an apology from Rupert but I'm still disappointed with the way in which, even in this rejoinder, he is overconfident in his statements of what he thinks Bernado believes. As with all of Bernado's interlocutor's I've heard so far, he doesn't seem to have done a deep enough study of anayltical idealism to be in a position to make any robust criticims. @Bernado, if you read this, I would welcome any pointers to constructive criticism of your work which you feel hits the mark in terms of rigour and depth to warrant serious reflection on your part. Having studied most of your corpus of work and 'lived into it' for a few years now, that is the kind of material I would value reading or listening to deepen my own understanding. Thanks.

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  13. This was a great clarification and apology from Rupert.

    I am curious about something. Rupert said this: "On page 2 of Analytic Idealism in a Nutshell, you write that Analytical Idealism “embraces reductionism”, by which you mean that “complex phenomena can be explained in terms of simpler ones.” As you point out, simpler does not necessarily mean smaller, but in the context of biology, reductionism in practice means reducing organisms to molecular processes, and behaviour to the activity of nerves."

    I think in this section, Rupert overstates your "commitment" to reductionism, as you have written about the value of holism in other books. Not only this, but there is an undercurrent in Rupert's comments on your work of interpreting your view as overly "scientific" and not amenable to accommodate other religious views. However, this is untrue, as in "Why Materialism is Baloney", you admit the possibility that there could be some form of soul under idealism (i.e., a deeper egoic loop that is less dissociated and which survives the death of the "physical" body). I wonder how deeply has he read your work, because to me, your view is pretty accommodating to a lot of religious and spiritual traditions, including animism, Christianity, Buddhism, Taoism, and others.

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  14. As I was reading this correspondence, I was wondering if the ‘god disagreement’ was simply a matter of semantics, where Rupert’s God and Bernardo’s Nature (Mind-at-Large) are essentially synonymous.

    But, there is, I think, a crucial difference, in that Rupert’s Abrahamic God is often assumed to possess meta-consciousness, as evident in the ability to judge moral virtue. While ‘acts’ may, in theory, be algorithmically and objectively determined as ’good’ or ‘evil’, could the content of one’s inner self (or soul, to use religious language) be judged against the ideal ‘good soul’ in the absence of meta-conscious contemplation?

    If I read Bernardo correctly, he argues that nature is spontaneous, instinctive, but vitally not meta-conscious. There is no intrinsic notion of good and evil (which is more akin to some Eastern traditions, although I don’t know enough about these to make confident assertions). Bernardo has also suggested that perhaps the meta-conscious capabilities that have evolved in creatures like us are, in effect, nature’s conscience; that is to say, dissociated mentation that has the capacity to judge moral virtue is of great value to the wider mind from which it is dissociated. In effect, we are encapsulations of the evolving meta-consciousness of nature itself.

    It seems to me that while Rupert’s God has an innate meta-conscious quality from which arises the ability to judge and contemplate the formation of worlds, in Bernardo’s Nature, meta-consciousness is an epiphenomenon of a more primal source; a simple field of subjectivity, devoid of qualities.

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