Over the past several days, multiple people have commented in my blog and social media spaces about criticisms of Analytic Idealism made by Dr. Rupert Sheldrake in the Theories of Everything podcast/YouTube channel. Before today, I hadn't seen the video and thus had largely dismissed most of those comments as probably exaggerated, as I've known Rupert for years, and know him to be a careful, nuanced thinker and an impeccable gentleman. Today, however, after receiving yet another comment, I looked up the segment in question, which I link to below (see time stamp 8:14 min).
I confess to have been taken aback by this video. I shall try to respond to Rupert's criticisms as objectively as I can, but I will likely fail at times. For I have read, respected, and admired Rupert's work for years before I even started publishing my own. His attack comes as an entirely unexpected curveball from someone quite close to my philosophical (and even personal) heart, and thus brings up emotions that are best left out of analytic discourse.
Here are my responses, in the same chronological order with which Rupert's criticisms are laid out in the video above.
FOR SCIENCE, IT'S BUSINESS AS USUAL
Rupert seems to consider it a weakness of Analytic Idealism that it doesn't contradict science. I, on the other hand, consider it not as much a virtue as a prerequisite for any tenable metaphysics. For science has worked phenomenally well in attempting to model and predict the behavior of nature for the past four centuries. Any metaphysics implying that science should not work is thus simply wrong, on overwhelming empirical grounds. Science surely doesn't replace level-headed metaphysics, as some scientists have naively maintained, but as a modelling and predictive method it obviously works. And Rupert, as a scientist, surely knows this.
I have never been anti-science, much to the contrary. To my dismay, more and more I realize that a significant minority of my readers thought of me, for some reason, as being in some kind of anti-science crusade. I even expressed my befuddlement about this recently, as I don't understand where this vastly mistaken impression comes from. It has never been correct. Anyone paying attention to my output will definitely have noticed that I ground much of what I say in scientific results, and have done so from the outset.
Perhaps Rupert's point is that Analytic Idealism doesn't sufficiently open new degrees of freedom or avenues of investigation for science. But if so, that is simply wrong. Over the years, I have tirelessly emphasized precisely these new avenues for scientific investigation; so often, in fact, that I don't even know where to start quoting from my corpus.
In general lines, because, under Analytic Idealism, our minds are simply dissociated from the cognitive space that constitutes the rest of nature, it is entirely conceivable that factors that weaken the dissociation could lead to phenomena such as forms of telepathy and clairvoyance. I never elaborated at length on this merely because I am not an expert in parapsychology and do not have the background required to say something of distinguished value here. I am also not personally very interested in extraordinary phenomena because I find the ordinary mysterious and confusing enough. I say this with no prejudice or judgment; it's just how I feel. Either way, if Rupert's point was that Analytic Idealism doesn't open the doors to new avenues of investigation in science, such as those explored in his own work, then that is false.
Rupert highlights that Analytic Idealism is still naturalist and reductionist. That is entirely correct. I think the world unfolds spontaneously, according to its own inherent dispositions (i.e., the observed regularities we call the 'laws of nature'), and without supernatural intervention from an outside agent beyond the boundaries of nature itself. I am promoting an analytic ontology, not a religion. And I think reductionism, if interpreted correctly (namely, that complex things can be explained in terms of simpler ones, as opposed to the vulgar view of reductionism according to which big things must be reducible to small things), is more than likely true; or should at the very least be the operationally preferred avenue for modeling nature, since it has worked well for a few centuries now. The only view my naturalism and reductionism contradict is some form of Abrahamic theism, literally interpreted. But if Rupert's criticism is motivated by his theistic views, I think they are inappropriate in the context of science and philosophy; that is, his criticisms don't count. What he sees as a liability, I see as a strength.
ANALYTIC IDEALISM IS JUST A FORM OF PHYSICALISM
Prior to today, I could never have imagined that such a superficial misunderstanding could come from a nuanced and careful thinker and communicator as I have known Rupert to be. It is an in-your-face misrepresentation of Analytic Idealism, a vulgar straw man, conveyed in a confusingly enthusiastic, authoritative, and definitive tone. I'd have expected him to, at the very least, have preambled his unfortunate mischaracterization with words like, "as far as I understand it," or "insofar as I know from briefly looking at it," or something to that effect. That would have been a bare minimum, for the sake of transparency, caution, and honesty. But he presented himself, in both tone and demeanour, as an expert thoroughly acquainted with the thing he was liberally mischaracterizing.
The only metaphysical equivalence between Analytic Idealism and mainstream Physicalism is that both acknowledge the existence of an external world beyond our individual minds. But this is surely hard to contest, short of some form of solipsism. Even the emerging physics of first-person perspective (see video below, for instance) indirectly acknowledges some ontological ground common to different observers, and wherein observers appear to one another, even if such common ground isn't strictly physical. Under Analytic Idealism, it is mental, what we call 'physicality' being simply how we cognitively represent this common ontological ground upon observations. In other words, physicality is a dashboard representation, upon measurement, of the real and mental world that is measured. But this mental world measured is really real; it is really out there and doesn't depend on observation. After all, there is something that is measured. Why would Rupert expect anything else? How could anything else be defended in an analytically or empirically viable manner?
Beyond this, Analytic Idealism is entirely distinct from mainstream Physicalism, to such a vast and obvious degree it seems pointless to explain further to anyone who has ever become modestly acquainted with my output. Yet, I do acknowledge that thinking of Analytic Idealism as in some sense equivalent to Physicalism is a common misconception among superficial and careless 'social media pundits.' But I know Rupert not to be one of those. Be that as it may, I responded to this misconception in many places, most notably in my new book, Analytic Idealism in a Nutshell. I quote the relevant passage below:
“Well, Bernardo, if all science is still valid under Analytic Idealism, and there is still a world out there independent of us, then Analytic Idealism is basically Physicalism under a different label; it all boils down to the same thing.”
This astonishingly shortsighted perspective is surprisingly common. If you identified with it, don’t blame yourself too harshly. The reason why the perspective is shortsighted is that it wholly ignores the colossal differences in the implications of Analytic Idealism when compared to mainstream Physicalism. But our culture rewards quick judgment calls and, therefore, discourages the depth of thinking required to explore the implications of new ideas.
Under Analytic Idealism, your life, your metabolism, is not the cause or generator of your consciousness, but merely what your private mentation looks like from the outside; i.e., from across your dissociative boundary. Life is what the dissociation looks like. Therefore, the end of life is the end of the dissociation, not the end of consciousness.
The end of a dissociative process is also not the end of the mental states held within the dissociative boundary; it is merely the end of the dissociative boundary. This means that the mental states previously held by the alter—your lifetime of memories and insights—are released into the broader cognitive context of nature-at-large upon death. Our hard-earned memories and insights—typically the result of much suffering—are not lost upon death but, instead, become available to nature-at- large. Contrast this with the physicalist view: when you die, all your memories and insights are just lost forever, and all that suffering was for nothing. Clearly, these two scenarios aren’t even remotely similar, and their differences are of great relevance to our values, to how we make our life choices, and generally experience our lives.
In addition, although Analytic Idealism preserves— arguably even strengthens—the rationale for drugs and surgery in medicine, it opens an additional avenue for the treatment of organic ailments: talk therapy and related practices. For under Analytic Idealism, the body is not a mere mechanism distinct from mind, but the extrinsic appearance of mental processes. Therefore, any organic ailment is, at root, a mental ailment. This doesn’t mean that you can cure cancer with positive thinking—as we’ve discussed before, the ego complex is naturally dissociated from autonomous functions, and thus has limited causal influence on them. But it does mean that it’s sensible to research whether we can reach further down into our physiology through psychological means, so to address some ‘physical’ ailments. This, in fact, could be the missing account of the so-called placebo effect, which under Physicalism is just a vexing anomaly. Can we deliberately induce the effect through psychological methods, now that a coherent metaphysical framework validates and accounts for it?
I have already explored the implications of Analytic Idealism at length in previous writings, so won’t repeat all that here. It suffices to mention—as I did above—what I believe to be two of the more important ones. The invitation to you— especially if you feel tempted to regard Analytic Idealism as equivalent to Physicalism in any important sense—is to think about the different implications of these very different views. What changes for you if you understand yourself to be not a physical mechanism, but a mental being, whose mental contents and core subjectivity will never be lost to nature?
ANALYTIC IDEALISM MAKES NO EXPERIMENTAL PREDICTIONS THAT DISTINGUISH IT FROM PHYSICALISM
This is another rather crass and patently false misrepresentation, despite having been communicated with a tone of authority and definiteness. Again, I recently tackled this common but remarkably superficial straw man in my latest book. Here is the relevant passage:
“Isn’t Analytic Idealism unfalsifiable?”
Before directly answering this question, it’s important to notice that, when Karl Popper proposed falsifiability as a requirement for scientific theories, he was talking about, well, scientific theories—i.e., theories that model and predict the behavior of nature, not what nature is. A scientific theory must be falsifiable in the sense that it must make predictions about nature’s future behavior that can be checked against experimental outcomes. If this is not the case, the theory is unfalsifiable and, therefore, not a proper scientific theory.
But when it comes to Analytic Idealism—and mainstream Physicalism too—we’re not talking about a scientific theory that predicts nature’s future behavior; instead, we’re talking about metaphysical statements about what nature is. The criteria for choosing the best theory in this case is more diverse than falsifiability: they entail internal logical consistency, contextual coherence, conceptual parsimony, explanatory power, and empirical adequacy. The latter criterion means that the implications of a proper metaphysical theory must not contradict established science. And insofar as established science is falsifiable, a metaphysical theory must indeed relate to falsifiability, but only in an indirect way.
The applicable question is thus whether Analytic Idealism is consistent with established science. And the answer is an overwhelming ‘yes.’ As we have discussed earlier, established science has shown that—short of unfalsifiable theoretical fantasies for which there is no positive evidence—physical entities do not have standalone existence, being instead a product of measurement. This is exactly what Analytic Idealism maintains, since all ‘physical’ entities are dashboard representations of measurements, which only endure while a measurement is being performed. And it directly contradicts mainstream Physicalism, which presupposes precisely that physical entities, for being fundamental, must have standalone existence independent of observation.
Established science has also shown that there are cases— such as during the psychedelic state, as discussed earlier— in which brain activity decreases, while the richness and intensity of experience increases. This is at least very hard to make sense of under mainstream Physicalism, according to which there is nothing to experience but brain activity. But it can be comfortably accommodated by Analytic Idealism, according to which brain activity is just what inner experience looks like, from an external perspective; i.e., it is but an image of inner experience. And unlike causes, images don’t need to be complete: they don’t need to reveal everything there is to know about the phenomenon they represent. In the case of psychedelics, the images leave quite a bit out.
Moreover, psychedelics are only one case in which, contrary to physicalist expectations, brain function and the richness of experience are inversely correlated. As we have seen above, constriction of blood flow to the brain due to strangulation or G-forces—which reduce brain metabolism due to oxygen deprivation, or hypoxia—can lead to psychedelic-like trances and “memorable dreams.” Hyperventilation—which also constricts blood flow to the brain because it induces high blood alkalinity levels—can lead to life-transforming insights, a phenomenon leveraged by some therapeutic breathwork techniques. Even outright brain damage can lead, in some specific cases, to richer inner experience. In a condition called ‘acquired savant syndrome’ (look it up), some people who have suffered brain damage because of head trauma incurred during car accidents, lightning strikes, and even bullet wounds to the head, suddenly manifest extraordinary cognitive skills such as artistic talents, the ability to perform complex calculations almost instantaneously, and perfect memory. A large group of Vietnam war veterans who suffered damage to the frontal or parietal lobes has also been shown to have a higher propensity to life-transforming religious experiences (see: “Neural correlates of mystical experience,” by Irene Cristofori et al., published in Neuropsychologia, 2016). Even patients who suffered brain damage because of surgery for the removal of tumors experience significantly higher “self-transcendence” (see: “The spiritual brain: Selective cortical lesions modulate human self- transcendence,” by Cosimo Urgesi et al., published in Neuron, 2010). Moreover, a group of so-called ‘trance mediums’ displayed significantly reduced activity in areas of the brain related to reasoning and language processing, precisely when engaged in activities that require high reasoning and language processing (see: “Neuroimaging during trance state: A contribution to the study of dissociation,” by Julio Fernando Peres et al., published in PLoS ONE, 2012).
I could go on and on, but you get the picture. Although most of the times brain activity directly correlates with the richness of inner experience, in some specific but broad and consistent cases the opposite is true. These cases are the black swans that disprove Physicalism and substantiate Analytic Idealism.
The scientific evidence discussed above not only addresses the question of falsifiability for Analytic Idealism and mainstream Physicalism, it also provides positive empirical confirmation for Analytic Idealism across very different fields of science.
Clearly, Analytic Idealism is one of the most empirically-substantiated metaphysical hypotheses out there. It has 50 years of experimental evidence in Foundations of Physics going for it and, insofar as it lines up with, and provides metaphysical ground to, Integrated Information Theory, also decades in Neuroscience of Consciousness. Remarkably, Rupert's criticism here is the very opposite of the truth; a truth he has been overwhelmingly in a position to know for the past many years.
ANALYTIC IDEALISM IS AN ARMCHAIR THEORY
The use of the "armchair theory" stick has historically been meant to be derogatory and insulting, in both science and philosophy, which Rupert is very well aware of. It is entirely unnecessary in the context of argument-based, constructive exchanges meant to advance a debate between people who respect each other and each other's work. In short, it is the equivalent of a low blow. Why Rupert would choose to deliberately, and utterly unnecessarily, insult me is beyond my comprehension, for I have never been anything but kind and supportive of his work, and of him as a person (think of his TEDx censorship debacle, during which I came out in his defense to the point of vowing to never again give a TEDx talk). If I have offended Rupert at some point since the last time we were together (during a dinner in the fall of 2018, if I recall), I have done so wholly unknowingly. Our tone towards each other, and each other's work, had always been cordial and respectful. I simply do not know where this change comes from.
Be that as it may, his accusation immediately raises the question of how, precisely, Rupert's own trinitarian, theist ontology of transcendence (which he enthusiastically discusses in the second half of the video above, along overtly biblical lines) isn't armchair theory itself. How does Rupert ground a transcendent but deliberate, interventionist, almighty deity, along with its triune nature, objectively and empirically? What experiments has he proposed to verify this non-trivial hypothesis? By his own criteria, and short of shameless hypocrisy, these are critical, potentially disqualifying questions for evaluating any metaphysical theory, including his own.
THE TROUBLE WITH ANALYTIC IDEALISM IS THAT IT CAN'T EXPLAIN MATTER
This is the most vulgar and ostensibly bad-faith misrepresentation of my work in the entire criticism. Rupert creates an outrageous straw man by overtly suggesting that my attempt to account for matter is limited to the "ripples on the ocean" metaphor. He also seems to misuse his personal acquaintance with me to project the authority of being privy to my private thinking on the matter. Obviously, he is not. His criticisms make it clear to me that Rupert either has no scholarly-level understanding of Analytic Idealism (let alone a privileged one), or has chosen to make statements that are contrary to such an understanding. I sincerely comprehend neither scenario.
I do use the "ripples on the ocean" metaphor, but only after having delineated an explicit, precise, and elaborate account of matter under Analytic Idealism. Rupert must know this, just as anyone who has ever taken a more than casual interest in my work does. For goodness' sake, I've written an entire PhD thesis on this very subject, plus a bunch of peer-reviewed papers. How plausible is it that I got all those publications and a second doctorate by limiting my case to "ripples on the ocean"? And just so I point to something accessible to non-academics, here is a free online video course in which I, for more than six hours (!), elaborate on how Analytic Idealism accounts for matter.
Rupert is outrageously misrepresenting my attempt to make my work accessible to the general public through metaphor as lack of substance, rigour, and precision; and he knows it. That he, as a scholar, would choose to do so is beyond me. In my opinion, his statements here come dangerously close to a deliberate attempt to misinform by creating straw men, which is unbecoming of any scholar, let alone Rupert Sheldrake. And if his defence here is that he simply wasn't aware of the depth of my output (which I'd find totally implausible, as I know that he knows better than that), then the authoritative tone he chose to adopt, and the definitive statements of fact he chose to make, are questionable in precisely the same manner. When you know that you aren't necessarily familiar with what you are talking about, you just don't talk the way he does in the video above.
ANALYTIC IDEALISM IS WRONG BECAUSE IT STOPS AT VERSE 2 OF THE BOOK OF GENESIS
It is obvious to anyone how I am going to defend myself from this particular criticism. But before I do so, allow me to say this: I profoundly respect religious writings and intuitions. I believe they hint at aspects of reality that cannot be captured in language, Aristotelian logic, or conceptual models. I wrote extensively about this in my book More Than Allegory. As such, I am open to the possibility that Analytic Idealism is indeed incomplete; as a matter of fact, I'm downright sure of it, for how can bipedal apes come up with accurate and complete models of nature? So I do not pooh-pooh religion-based criticisms of Analytic Idealism. I've had no religious upbringing myself, but this also means that I have no axe to grind against religion.
However, I do not think that views based on religious intuition count as analytic or empirical arguments. And this is precisely what Rupert is ostensibly attempting to do here: to denounce Analytic Idealism as an inadequate philosophy on analytic and scientific grounds. This is obviously bad form, insofar as it misleadingly veils religious motivations with the veneer of rational argument. And it certainly doesn't justify the vast straw men, misrepresentations and misleading statements made with an equally misleading tone of authority.
GOD IS THE BASIC GROUND OF CONSCIOUSNESS, THEREFORE ANALYTIC IDEALISM IS WRONG
I shall leave this one unanswered, even though it's the part of his criticism where he spends by far the most time on, and seems to be emotionally invested in the most. I highlight it here simply because it seems to confirm a feeling I had throughout Rupert's activist manifesto against Analytic Idealism: I suspect that he, because of his religious dispositions, feels offended by Analytic Idealism's naturalist, reductionist ethos. Perhaps he sees the purely rational, dry, empirically-grounded articulation in my latest book as a betrayal of some tacit, implicit, unspoken pact of trust between us, of which I was unaware. Perhaps he sees my renewed emphasis on the complete and unreserved compatibility between science and Analytic Idealism, which I've always taken for granted to be self-evident, as a similar betrayal. But it is useless to speculate further on his motivations, as I have no direct access to Rupert's inner state when he chose to say what he said. All I am left with is my bafflement and disappointment in face of what he did say, and of how he said it.
Personally, I don't see any fundamental contradiction between naturalism and reductionism on the one hand, and religious faith on the other, provided that one isn't a literalist. I regard nature as a vast ocean of subjectivity, which says enough about how these things could be reconciled. But I don't think it is appropriate for a scholar to misrepresent and attack another's analytic views because of religious convictions. Neither is the attack appropriate if it is motivated not by level-headed argument, but an emotional reaction to a perceived religious offence or betrayal instead.
I profoundly regret this episode, as it has robbed me of my dearly-held respect for someone I have overtly admired and regarded as a role model for many years. My disappointment is bitter, and the criticism, invalid as it is, did sting at a very personal level. But onwards we go, in the spirit of honesty and openness.
I think you are right that neither idealism nor physicalism are theories that are testable or falsifiable but rather metaphysical standpoints. But what then is a metaphysical standpoint if it is not a falsifiable truth claim?
ReplyDeleteIt is rather a metaphor, a poem, an artistic creation. Metaphysics is literature, poetry, art, personal expression. I don't see people spending too much time arguing which is more "true:" Bach or Beethoven, Homer or Aeschylus, Van Gogh or Matisse. It would make no sense. Each creativity is a unique and highly personal expression born out of existential experience. If others find it interesting or moving, that's fine. Not everyone likes the same art, but arguing about which artistic expression is more "true" makes no sense at all.
Apophatic traditions have always realized that the nature of reality is beyond thought, concept or words. On the other hand, we >are< the nature of reality in various unique expressions, each of which is a dream poem of that which is beyond all thought.
I do get the spirit of this view, but I also vehemently reject it: some 'poems' are untenable, others are supremely implausible. We can do better than embrace untenable and implausible 'poems' just because they are poetic.
DeleteI've never seen any literary criticism describing poems as "untenable" or "implausible". Again, these are words that describe falsifiable theories or assertions in an empirical setting. And that is precisely what metaphysics is >not<. Has any metaphysical expression/poem ever been "proven" or "disproven"? Of course not, because they make no falsifiable predictions: they are artistic expressions more or less interesting, or inspiring, or moving as literature.
DeleteHave you read the above fully? I discuss this quite explicitly, right above. While Popper's falsifiability doesn't apply to metaphysics directly, nature's behavior can (and does) contradict certain metaphysical hypotheses, thereby ruling them out. Moreover, other criteria of suitability apply entirely to metaphysics: conceptual parsimony, internal consistency, empirical adequacy, overall coherence, explanatory power, etc. Not all metaphysics are born equal, otherwise let's hold hands and open the gates to bullshit while singing the Kumbaya. I vehemently reject the notion that metaphysics is just like poetry, unmoored in any criteria of truth or adequacy. If that's what you think, I am not with you in it. Your position would deface and invalidate philosophy as a discipline.
DeleteI never said there was no truth in poetry: it's just not syllogistic or quantifiable truth. Take the religious metaphors that Rupert mentions in the video: he likes trinities better than dualities or monisms. OK thats his predilection, and he seems to be claiming that trinities are "better" at elucidating more of some interpretation of reality that he prefers. But look at history: when some of those trinities were taken literally or objectively instead of metaphorically, then history was bathed in blood. It's like if you had an army of people who prefer Tolstoy and another army of people who prefer Dostoevsky, and they start killing each other because the opposite side are infidels. My contention is as soon as you treat a metaphysical metaphor as a physical law like gravity with an objective truth value that may be greater than some other metaphor, there is a danger of going down that same road, either metaphorically or literally. If you can demonstrate that your preferred metaphysical metaphor can have real world benefits that other metaphors don't have such as curing cancer or ending wars, then perhaps it can be claimed that which metaphor one prefers has significance beyond the personal. But as I pointed out, history shows that when metaphysical metaphors are taken literally, bad shit happens.
DeleteRosati, your approach reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature and purpose of metaphysical theories. By conflating metaphysics with art or poetry, you dismiss the evaluative frameworks that philosophers like Kastrup employ to assess the validity and utility of such theories. Additionally, your reliance on logical fallacies weakens your position and fails to engage with the substantive arguments presented by Kastrup.
DeleteNotably:
1. You seem to interpret metaphysical theories solely as personal or aesthetic expressions, neglecting their role in attempting to explain the fundamental nature of reality. This misinterpretation leads you to undervalue the substantive claims these theories make.
2. You do not engage with the philosophical standards that govern metaphysical discourse, such as logical consistency, empirical adequacy, and explanatory power. Without addressing these criteria, you fail to grasp the evaluative framework that Kastrup employs.
3. By equating metaphysics with art or literature, you are conflating distinct domains that operate under different evaluative principles. This conflation leads to a fundamental misunderstanding of how metaphysical theories are developed, debated, and assessed within philosophical discourse.
I could point out where you have employed logical fallacies such as a category error, false analogy, setting up a Straw Man, equivocation, an appeal to tradition and a covert Ad Hominem....instead, I'll meet you on your ground:
In realms where deep ideas deploy,
Rosati paints them as mere ploy.
With metaphors he skips the fray,
A cheeky, naughty boy at play.
Monkey: best would be to first discover through introspection the universally available experiences that have led to what has been called the apophatic tradition. next best would be to read up on it, particularly in its Neoplatonic, Zen and Advaita Vedanta expressions. Then, if you wish, you can play in the fields of kataphasis & metaphor without taking it too seriously.
DeleteRosati: even better would be to first understand the distinction between philosophy and theology. Then you are much less likely to fall foul of an old entreaty "Better to remain silent and only be thought a fool than to open the mouth and remove all doubt"
DeleteEven better than that would be to actually read Kastrup's work first and then you will have no need to make appeals to the supernatural. You could then enjoy being as frivolous or serious as you please.
Before you mix the sacred with the wise,
Understand where true philosophy lies.
Dive into Kastrup’s thoughtful streams,
Avoid the pitfalls of unfounded dreams.
Let silence guard your earnest quest,
Before theology blends with your best.
Read, reflect, and then you’ll see,
Clarity in thought sets minds free.
Very nice rebuttal to oddly hostile commentary from sheldrake. Pure speculation, but I can only think the hostility comes from analytic idealism posing a formidable threat to one’s wish to preserve a notion of God as a conscious agent, as opposed to a more naturalistic account. I think you alluded to this possibility in this article.
ReplyDeleteRupert Sheldrake is a person who is known for postulating the theory of 'morphogenetic fields', which had already been suggested as Rupert knows well by someone else. He called his son Merlin and believes in the Christian god. Rupert is as bigoted in his views as the next man, he certainly can recite academic titbits but offers little IMO when put beside Federico Faggin. Largely I think Bernado Kastrup's Analytical idealism is very broadly right though Bernado may fall short in recognising that consciousness may well have evolved into God, albeit not the Christian version. So as far as I am concerned Bernado is more right that Rupert who sadly like many cannot escape the shackles of his youthful indoctrination.
DeleteI think you are spot on. Rupert has emotion behind his words here and I don’t think it has anything to to with BK and more to do with his notion of a supreme intelligence.
ReplyDeleteAlvin, it’s a shame. Just as Jung’s departure from his mentor, Freud, was an emotional one, it was necessary to keep his intellectual integrity. Kudos to Bernardo for sticking to his guns in the face criticism from a respected authority.
ReplyDeleteIt seems that Rupert Sheldrake became (maybe with his elderly age) religiously demagogic and he can see that his literal reading of Bible is not defensible. Sad, but no rational arguments could help it.
ReplyDeleteThis must be a tough one! If it means anything Bernardo, re-reading some of your material recently has left me with a great deal of peace, particularly the spatial metaphor of us being in mind, and our brains filtering in it. There's a beautiful unity there, and it rings true for me.
ReplyDeleteI've lost a lot of respect for Rupert after this, and I must say that it is swaying me further away from what Jung referred to as creeds. It seems that Rupert can't take you seriously as you threaten his dogma.
His morphic fields must be out of whack. But seriously, what a strange series of points by Sheldrake.
ReplyDeleteGreat respect for your open, honest and clear respons to Rupert’s criticism. I totally agree with you Bernardo. And remember; this kind of situations are part of truth seeking, it is needed for you and others. The truth is always winning, always! And you are a very important person to let the world know about the real truth.
ReplyDeleteVery disappointed by the nature of Ruperts comments here. They moved from both attacking the theory to attacking you personally (BK) which was very much uncalled for. I think your rebuttal above is solid, and I'd like to hear Ruperts response to this, although if I'm to be totally honest, it seems his religious convictions are growing stronger with old age which may be a contributing factor in this strange attack on you.
ReplyDeleteThere is a real irony in Ruperts comments about analytical idealism having a weakness in not contradicting science. Pansychism, by it's nature panders to physicalism in so far as it still adheres to the basic tenet of physicalism of 'matter' being prior to consciousness. The beauty of analytical idealism is that it manages to both contradict science whilst respecting it's fantastic ability to measure the world as we see it.
The Trinity idea Rupert likes is presumably that our manifest universe requires Creator, Created and Process (or Relationship between them). However, Brahma as Creator is not Brahman, the underlying unity or nondual ground of being. So there need be no contradiction between ultimate reductionism to Brahman (formlessness) and the universal flow from Brahma in form via the trinity (Brahma Siva Vishnu). I should have at least expected him to acknowledge that.
ReplyDeleteI think I may see where the source of contention lies between the two. Like Rupert, I was raised in some flavor of the Christian theological tradition. While I’ve moved beyond that long ago, it is difficult to move completely past the imprint that the universe is presided over by some sort of awareness, possessing a benign, purposeful, intentional stance toward creation.
ReplyDeletePerhaps something was lost in translation but if I recall correctly, in a past interview, Bernardo suggested that mind-at-large is not “intelligent”, nor proceeds with deliberation — instead functioning more instinctually or habitually. In that sense, it might point back to humanity as the locus of the former; implying that “man is the measure of all things” — a view that characterizes materialist philosophy.
The only way I can resolve it for myself is to try to be comfortable with the stance that ultimate reality, beneath space and time, beneath the quantum, is probably beyond our present ability to conceptualize. Not very satisfying, but …
Bernardo's model easily incorporates most of what Sheldrake wants to have in his theology, minus a self-conscious deliberative God.
DeleteThat said, Bernardo allows for the fundamental archetypes of mind-at-large to be deeply 'intelligent' and filled to the brim with telos, just not a self-conscious and deliberative telos.
I'm much more in awe of a God acting intuitively towards and through creation than a God scratching His beard and trying to figure out where to fit the legs and how many...
Bernardo is rightfully perplexed as to why Rupert misrepresented so much of his view. And Rupert probably just isn't that interested in general models of ontology; he seems to be more happy moving between his experiments in morphic resonance and his life of prayer. Nothing wrong with that at all. I just hope he does see that he could treat Bernardo's ideas with a bit more respect by simply not strawmanning them anymore. I have good hope.
>] I have already explored the implications of Analytic Idealism at length in previous writings, so won’t repeat all that here. It suffices to mention—as I did above—what I believe to be two of the more important ones. The invitation to you— especially if you feel tempted to regard Analytic Idealism as equivalent to Physicalism in any important sense—is to think about the different implications of these very different views. What changes for you if you understand yourself to be not a physical mechanism, but a mental being, whose mental contents and core subjectivity will never be lost to nature?"
ReplyDeleteWhy should anything change at all in this scenario? To say that my mental contents and core subjectivity would be available to Nature might, at first blush, sound at least plausibly better than the absolute annihiliation that comes from the natural consequences of Physicalism - but to me it sounds still rather horrifying.
A great deal of hardship and effort has been given to building the vast plethora that is my inner subjective world. That all of this should be given, without my personal consent, to an existence that's effectively acting out like a rampaging child with no self-reflective regard for the dissociative identity that is me seems little better than Physicalism.
Arguably it's even worse than that. Under Physicalism one is simply a victim of an unfeeling, dead universe that has no particular regard for you one way or the other. Here, however, we've a mental world that's both unaware of you (because it didn't create you with any particular intent or plan in mind, yes?) only to absorb all the meaningful contents that make you You upon physical death; not even because it has a meaningful goal in mind, but simply because it's acting out its own nature.
It's simply doing what it's doing because it is what it is, yes?
Where is the incentive for morality or a value-oriented structure of any kind in this? Why, for example, should we care about what happens in Ukraine (a situation I've no doubt you care very deeply about) when the universe itself would seem to treat every individual that's ever existed as the equivalent of cogs in a machine?
The problem here is that humans *are* moral creatures. We do, in fact, act out our entire lives through the lens of those values that motivate us - a desire for Happiness, Beauty, Truth (which I'm sure you yourself can appreciate), etc. Yet to indulge the idea that Reality's acting out as a means of getting its act together (or however one wishes to phrase it) seems to demand a bottom-up causative structure, again little different from Physicalism.
Actually it takes it one step further than that. Nature, it would seem, is both top-down in its dissociative formations and bottom-up in its need of those very same dissociations to feed mental contents back to itself that Mind-at-Large can't do on its own. Not even Physicalism goes that far, for better or worse.
Even in a scenario where those innumerable mental contents eventually merited a change in Nature however, that very change wouldn't come about because of any intrinsic value or moral purpose. It couldn't, otherwise it would've already been a part of Nature in the first place and thus it would've had no impulse to do anything. Therefore that outcome could only be perfectly arbitrary, a matter of mere convenience brought about by circumstance.
In all seriousness, where is the meaning in that? One cannot find such a thing in a world devoid of fundamental values in the first place - and any attempt to create it in the future could only be called a cruel joke, an arbitrary poduct brought about by happenstance that has no persuasive power on its own terms.
Ryan AshfyreTuesday, November 26, 2024 8:34:00 AM
DeleteVery interesting reply. I have struggle with this myself. It would seem to me that this Mind of Large from a human point of view and in the way Bernardo describes it actually looks like the worst hell anyone could ever imagine. No possibility for an ending ever and just endless dissociated fluctuations experienced as suffering a billion times over and why? Just because Mind at Large is bored or "wants to know itself"? Or for no reason what soever and only in essens explained by "it is what it is and does what it does"? What a horror.
Even though discussions on YouTube between Bernardo and his friend Rupert Spira in lastest versions seemed to show that they fundamentally agree it was interesting and worth noting to me that in their previous discussions they didn't exactly seem to be on the same page, because Rupert Spira insisted that Consciousness in essens is Love in it's most unconditional form. It still seems unresolved for me though what Bernardo's stand is here. Is
Anyway would I think would be great for all of us would be a chance to watch and follow a discussion between the great minds of today on these very issues in a world forum of brave, curious and open thinkers like Bernardo Kastrup himself, like Michael Levin and others also from the scientific world of various sectors. Wouldn't it possibly be more 'productive' for human kind?
Ryan, you express your criticism well! However! You do not state a more pleasant alternative. Analytic Idealism accounts for the world we experience, it does not try to sugar-coat it. If MAL were metacognitive, then creating dissociated alters to suffer would be worse – the moral failing would be at the top! You do not say that you believe the Universe is fundamentally loving, but if you believe that, where is the evidence? Jung has the loving impulse as one of twelve main archetypes – and that accords with our experience here on planet Earth. If you believe in Heaven where all will be well, then why do Buddhism and Hinduism and others talk of reincarnation? Why return from Heaven to Earth? All very mysterious! In the meantime, good philosophy tries to account for the world as experienced, not as we wish it would be.
DeleteLet me start out by saying I appreciate the depth of your comment. I only have a question for you. Isn't our true Identity MAL? If so, does this change anything do you think? MAL is ultimately acasual to me it seems, otherwise I can't really make sense of this all. The going to only seems to be from the perspective of the alter/disassociation. So in some sense, isn't MAL "already whole"?
DeleteSorry if this is foolish line of thought, I'm no expert.
Have a wonderful day.
I also was surprised by what Sheldrake said, especially that there's no difference between Analytic idealism and Physicalism. I see this remark often from spiritual types who are like "Analytic idealism isn't any different than physicalism because it doesn't contain God, reincarnation, karma, morality, etc. etc. They're missing the point. Analytic idealism is not a religion. It's just a more straightforward and sensible metaphysics than physicalism. Analytic idealism doesn't even necessarily exclude woo-woo stuff, on the contrary, it creates a framework where the woo could potentially exist.
ReplyDeleteExactly. It would be like after introducing somebody to a kitchen and all of its basic instruments and tools, somebody cried out, "But there's no pies, omelettes or baked bread!"
DeleteBernardo is making specific lines of arguement for the specific idea that reality is mental not physical. He points to those arguements and bundles them together so that a person can inspect them and compare them to other ontological claims.
Bernardo is not designing paranormal experiments to prove or understand various mechanisms of interesting phenomena. His model makes room for all of that to be valid, but isn't about proving specific claims.
I do see many people who come harshly at Bernardo who seem to be unconsciously annoyed that he isn't verifying or arguing for their specific views regarding spiritual reality.
I hope Bernardo can speak with Iain McGilchrist before Iain puts forward a similar public misunderstanding of Bernardo's work.
ReplyDeleteIain is already criticizing Bernardo's 'dashboard' metaphor in various ways. To me, it seems Iain is taking the metaphor too literally, juxtaposing his view against Bernardo's in a way that mischaracterizes Bernardo's perspective.
I’ve been hoping Iain and Bernardo could clear this up before it becomes an unnecessary wedge. My hunch is that Sheldrake was not coming from a place of antipathy but rather that he has oversimplified Bernardo's view, storing it as merely an example of a model he—Sheldrake—is not drawn to due to its lack of theological elements. I imagine that if Bernardo approaches him without too much overt passion or emotion, Sheldrake will likely retract his comments in the future. In fact, I think Sheldrake might do so even if he perceives Bernardo's response as overly personal.
That said, I completely understand Bernardo's perplexed and disappointed reaction.
Where have you witnessed Ian McGilchrist criticizing Bernardo's dashboard metaphor? I would be very interested to learn what he is saying about that.
DeleteHi Lance. I'm not sure how to post these so that my name shows up—it only offers me the 'Unknown' option, which is sort of frustrating.
DeleteI remember it was about a year ago when a few of us first noticed McGilchrist disagreeing with Bernardo's model. It came up in at least two interviews he did around that time. I wish I had filed them away. I think at least one of us emailed Bernardo, just to make sure it was on his radar. For me, the idea isn’t about drawing these people into personal arguments. I just think McGilchrist has a different style and objective that doesn’t mesh well with the specific 'dashboard' metaphor.
McGilchrist seems to want our representations to have some intrinsic and meaningful connection to what they represent—not merely as dials or mechanisms that help us survive. That said, I think he is open to the broader point that our senses didn’t evolve to create images resembling the outer world.
Anyway, I know Bernardo has written a beautiful chapter near the end of The Idea of the World that approaches perception in a way McGilchrist would likely be much warmer to. I also understand why Bernardo might feel the need to hammer home the point about perception using a metaphor as extreme as dials on a dashboard.
That said, the Goethean in me is very curious about how the whole is always working its way into the parts, as the parts. In that sense, it seems that only the core archetypes could have interacted with the first forms of life. This would mean that the evolution of the senses is, at its heart, the evolution of representing the whole in increasingly complex and holistic ways. To that degree, I like to think of the 'dials' less as purely arbitrary signals of measurement for survival and more as an evolving script—one that speaks not only to life forms about surviving but also about much, much more, if they learn to read it more deeply.
Besides all the very obvious mischaracterisations Rupert seems to be making here, on a side note I find it sort of peculiar the way he discusses the differences between the trinitarian and monist perspectives - as if the trinitarian point of view is a viable candidate for a bottom-level analytic metaphysics. He mentions how Descartes discarded the "soul" as a component of the trinity and that modern materialists and idealists "like Kastrup" sense that there's something "wrong" with this viewpoint and therefore seek to reduce the ontology further down to a single primitive (Around 15:00-17:00). But how could it be the case that matter, soul and spirit are all ontological primitives in the way that Bernardo means to say that consciousness is an ontological primitive? It seems to me that Rupert is mixing and matching the personal, mythopoeic way of understanding the world that can be achieved through ideas like the "soul," and the analytic search for an ontological primitive which can serve as a rational explanatory starting point. These are two very different pursuits. For example, Rupert would be hard-pressed to prove analytically that some set of fundamental and mutually incommensurable substances like the "soul," "matter," and "spirit," all exist as absolute and fundamental ontological primitives in place of just matter or just consciousness. Whatever they may be, why should they not be analytically reducible to consciousness, however mythopoeically significant they might be? There seems to be a disconnect here between the kind of purpose Rupert and more "right-brained" spiritualists wants the ontological primitive to serve, and the purpose analytic philosophers like Bernardo want it to serve.
ReplyDeleteI've read "Analytical idealism in a nutshell" and I found it very interesting. It presents a metaphysics - very different from Physicalism - which says that beyond the horizon of our psyche there is more... psyche. This is very parcimonious, simple. Nature is an unbound field of subjectivity and matter has no standalone existence, it's just a representation of this field on our screen of perception. Bernardo says that you can call this field God if you like. Rupert probably doesn't like Idealism because it doesn't fit his view on God. Please, Rupert, don't start a new war on God again. This word usually engages too much emotion. That's why I like Bernardo's approach emotionnaly peaceful, based on parcimony, reason and evidence.
ReplyDeleteI posted an earlier comment speculating what it was about Bernardo’s philosophy that Rupert Sheldrake may have found unsettling. Since then, I’ve recalled one more. In one interview (unfortunately I’ve lost the reference) Bernardo suggested that MAL has no awareness of individual alters, and further that, if I remember correctly, “MAL doesn’t give a damn about you or me”. Obviously this would be upsetting to anyone raised in a traditional Christian tradition where “… not a sparrow falls to the ground apart from your Father’s care” (Matthew 10:29).
ReplyDeleteI suspect Bernardo was being a little cavalier in the remark, in that it implies a dualism that I’m pretty sure he does not subscribe to.