The magic trick of disappearing consciousness

(An improved and updated version of this essay has appeared in my book Brief Peeks Beyond. The version below is kept for legacy purposes.)

Source: Wikimedia Commons.

Explaining consciousness remains one of the top unanswered challenges in science and philosophy today. How can the warmth of love, the bitterness of disappointment, the redness of an apple, the sweetness of strawberries, be explained in terms of mass, momentum, charge, spin, or any of the attributes of matter? How can concrete qualities be explained in terms of abstract quantities and relationships? Nobody has an answer to this, and not for lack of trying. Such absolute failure to resolve the so-called 'hard problem of consciousness' has led to a bizarre twist in philosophy of mind over the past three or four decades: the trick of disappearing consciousness. In a nutshell, it consists of this: since we cannot explain consciousness in terms of unconscious matter, it must be the case that there is actually no consciousness; that consciousness is somehow an illusion. In what follows, I'll contend that this position is absurd, lacks empirical and logical integrity, and is pursued solely out of psychological, cultural, and social pressures. The very fact that I find myself in the position of having to make a case for this is a clear indication, I believe, of the appalling state of our culture and epistemology at all levels today, especially the highest, academic ones.

Philosopher Daniel Dennett is perhaps the leading proponent of the disappearing trick. In his book, inaccurately and rather pretentiously titled Consciousness Explained, as well as in his talks titled The Magic of Consciousness, Dennett shows that many of our perceptions and beliefs are illusory, in the sense that they do not correspond to consensus facts. He parades a whole list of perceptual illusions right out of National Geographic's TV show Brain Games to make his point. This, he claims, chips away at what we call 'consciousness' and will eventually lead to the conclusion that, ultimately, there is nothing there; that the notion of consciousness will 'disappear' once we understand all the tricks employed by the brain. It's difficult to see how illusions of and in consciousness can indicate the non-existence of consciousness (I tend to suspect that they indicate the opposite), but bear with me. As the title of one his TED talks illustrates, Dennett claims explicitly that consciousness – that is, qualia, subjective experience itself – is an illusion. At the end, there is just the material brain. Obviously, Dennett doesn't close his argument: he is unable to actually explain how some perceptual illusions – particular contents of consciousness – could possibly imply the non-existence of consciousness itself. He just leaves us with the promissory note that, at some point in the future, somehow this will be the case.

And Dennett isn't alone. Others, like psychologist Nicholas Humphrey, suggest the same thing, as this short video illustrates (also below). Despite being a surreal display of in-your-face incoherence, the fact that the video is cladded with the gentle and trust-inspiring demeanor of an affable old man renders it worth watching; if nothing else, for the curious cognitive dissonance it triggers. And since Richard Dawkins has recently tweeted this very video, I think it is fair to conclude that Dawkins too, endorses this curious view of the nature consciousness.

Nicholas Humphrey, philosophically thoughtful psychologist, on "Is Consciousness an Illusion?" https://t.co/6kGAaQFLOT
— Richard Dawkins (@RichardDawkins) September 11, 2014

Despite the surreal spectacle I just subjected you to, let us try to remain collected and lucid here. If consciousness is indeed an illusion, who or what exactly is having the illusion? Where can the illusion reside if not in consciousness itself? After all, if the illusion weren't in consciousness, we couldn't be talking about it, could we? The supposed non-existence of consciousness simply does not follow from the observation that certain perceptions or beliefs fail to correspond to consensus facts. If anything, what does follow is that there is such a thing as consciousness, where the illusions pointed out can reside. Dennett suggests that, if enough aspects of experience are found to not correspond to consensus facts, consciousness will be shown to be inexistent. This is wholly illogical: even if we find one day that everything we experience fails to correspond to consensus fact, that will simply show that consciousness is populated with illusions; it will leave consciousness itself intact. We are still conscious of illusions, in exactly the same way that we are conscious of our dreams. This is all so obvious it pains me to have to point it out.

To try and escape the inescapable, the magicians will appeal to language games and a kind of word-dance that materialist philosopher Galen Strawson called 'looking-glass': to use the word 'consciousness' in such a way that, whatever one means by it, it isn't what the word actually denotes. The result is two-fold: on the one hand, you can't pin down the magicians because, whenever you debunk a certain interpretation of their argument, they claim that they meant something else with the word 'consciousness.' On the other hand, the implication is that the magicians' position becomes entirely hollow. Why do they do this? Why these ridiculous semantic dances, word games, purely grammatical bridges pretending to be logical arguments, and promissory notes that defy reason? More on this below. For now, bear with me a little longer.

If we have the patience to tease apart some of these word-dances, we find out that what appears to be denied are just some of the face-value traits ordinarily attributed to consciousness, not consciousness itself. Consider this quote by Susan Blackmore in a 2002 article:

If consciousness seems to be a continuous stream of rich and detailed sights, sounds, feelings and thoughts, then I suggest this is the illusion.

First we must be clear what is meant by the term “illusion”. To say that consciousness is an illusion is not to say that it doesn’t exist, but that it is not what it seems to be―more like a mirage or a visual illusion. And if consciousness is not what it seems, no wonder it’s proving such a mystery.

Naturally, this completely empties the trick of any significance. Yes, consciousness apparently isn't exactly what it seems to be on face-value... duh. So what? To say that some of the face-value traits ordinarily attributed to consciousness are false doesn't mean that consciousness itself – raw subjective experience – is an illusion. To argue otherwise would be entirely equivalent to proclaiming that, because the Earth isn't flat – as it appears to be on face-value – then it must be an illusion; and to proclaim this while standing firmly on the Earth! Where is one 'standing' when one consciously proclaims consciousness to be an illusion?

Obviously, raw subjective experience – that is, consciousness – isn't an illusion: it is the only carrier of reality anyone can ever know. It is the sole undeniable empirical fact of existence. Yet, Blackmore chooses her language so to still be able to say 'consciousness is an illusion.' Read this part of her quote again: "To say that consciousness is an illusion is not to say that it doesn’t exist, but that it is not what it seems to be." This usage of language sounds a bit counterintuitive to me. When we say that the alien spaceship in the sky last night was an illusion, we mean that the spaceship wasn't there; that it didn't exist. Maybe an airplane existed there instead, but not the alien spaceship. Similarly, when we say that the movement in this image is an illusion, we mean that the movement isn't there; that it doesn't exist. But when it comes to consciousness, Blackmore departs from this intuitive usage of the term 'illusion.' Why? Why look for a counterintuitive way to still label consciousness an 'illusion'? At the very least, this opens the door wide open to misunderstandings, since the word 'illusion' clearly evokes non-existence. When we learned that the Earth was actually a spheroid, we didn't turn around and proclaim the Earth to be an illusion. We simply said that the Earth wasn't what it seemed to be. So why not just say: 'consciousness isn't what it seems to be' and stop there? Instead, Blackmore went as far as titling her piece "The Grand Illusion."

Before you get excited about conspiracy theories, I think the explanation for this is as human as it is prosaic: if a magician acknowledges that the 'illusion' of consciousness is just a matter of false attributions – like we falsely attributed flatness to the Earth without the Earth becoming any less real because of it – then the magic trick is revealed and loses its appeal. The magician that does this goes out of business. That some of the face-value traits ordinarily attributed to consciousness are false is trivial; it means exactly nothing as far as solving the hard problem of consciousness. It leaves us exactly where we started: we cannot, even in principle, explain how raw subjective experience arises from mass, momentum, charge or spin. But would that be an acceptable admission? Careers have been built on the premise that we are making progress in unraveling the 'hard problem.' If that turns out not to be the case, what would happen to funding, prestige and promotions? What would happen to one's legacy even after one's death? What would happen to one's feelings of self-worth and meaning in life? In this context, it is easy to see how tempting it could be to find a way to say that 'consciousness is an illusion' (even though it would more-than-likely evoke the wrong meaning, as it actually did) and thereby implicitly suggest that the 'hard problem' is becoming more treatable. Look at the last statement in Blackmore's quote: "if consciousness is not what it seems, no wonder it’s proving such a mystery." This is a rather overt attempt to understate the 'hard problem.' And it is fallacious. Give this some thought, but please notice: I am not suggesting here that there is purposefully misleading or dishonest behavior on the part of Susan Blackmore or anyone else. I personally, and sincerely, do not think that such is the case. I rather think she and the other magicians are fooling themselves; the left hand doesn't know what the right hand is doing. Indeed, what I am suggesting is that we all have natural, understandable, and perhaps even unavoidable subconscious motivations that impact our opinions and judgment in a way that completely escapes the field of our critical awareness. And I believe that this is behind much of the in-your-face incoherence and absurdity in philosophy of mind today. The subconscious power of emotional commitment to a position, once one become's invested in it, should not be underestimated; even among those who proclaim the supremacy of logic and reason.

Other magicians don't go as far as Dennett, but buy into – and promote – the fundamental notion underlying the magic trick. Take Paul and Patricia Churchland, for instance: their claim is that certain aspects of conscious experience do not really exist – like beliefs and intentions – although something most of us would call 'belief' and 'intention' is undeniably experienced by every person to have ever lived. The Churchlands conclude so because these aspects of experience appear to be structured along syntactical patterns that have no obvious correspondence in brain anatomy or function. Naturally, one can criticize their position by pointing out that one also cannot find the high-level structure of software in the gates and wires of the computer chip running the software. Nonetheless, that obviously doesn't mean that the software structure is inexistent. But let's leave this aside. The point here is this: the Churchlands contribute to the absurd notion that one can deny the existence of direct, felt experience on the basis of theoretical abstractions.

The Churchlands' position is ontology-bound: they start from the inference that the brain generates the mind. Therefore, if you cannot find a brain-basis for a certain aspect of experience, then that aspect of experience cannot exist. This is entirely logical if you accept the premise. However, it doesn't change the fact that people experience something we ordinarily call 'beliefs' and 'intentions.' Even if it were correct to call it an illusion, the then-illusory experience would still be a fact as such. Whatever the case, the experience isn't nothing. And, because of the 'hard problem,' it remains entirely unexplained, despite the Churchlands' best efforts.

The Churchlands' definition of 'illusion' is based on the notion of correspondence: a thing or phenomenon A is only not-illusion if it directly corresponds to a thing or phenomenon B; otherwise it is illusion. In this specific case, A is the subjective experience of beliefs and intentions and B is the corresponding structures and dynamics in the brain. But think about this without any a priori ontological assumptions for a moment: does A stop existing just because there isn't a B to which A corresponds? Have your experiences of belief and intention disappeared just because someone couldn't find anything corresponding to them in the brain? Of course not. We could define the word 'illusion' so that we could label those experiences as 'illusions,' but that doesn't make them disappear. As existents, they must still be explained by neuroscience and philosophy of mind. The Churchlands don't help us do so.

You must now be thinking: 'OK Bernardo, you have rejected every avenue ever attempted for solving the hard problem of consciousness. So what is your solution?' My solution is simple: there is no hard problem to begin with; it is merely a linguistic and conceptual construction. You see, the 'hard problem' only arises when you (a) infer the existence of a whole universe outside consciousness, and (b) postulate that this universe somehow generates consciousness. So you end up in the position of having to explain how an abstraction of consciousness can generate consciousness. This circular problem can never be solved! We're just chasing our own tails at light speed.

Every theory of nature must grant at least one free miracle: a so-called ontological primitive. This is so because we always need to explain one thing in terms of another thing. Clearly, however, we can't keep on explaining one thing in terms of another, and then another, and then another, forever. At some point you hit rock-bottom: you encounter a thing that you simply cannot explain, but in terms of which you can explain everything else. That thing is the ontological primitive. Under materialism, depending on your favorite theory, examples of ontological primitives are the laws of physics and the fundamental subatomic particles in the Standard Model; or the hyper-dimensional branes of M-theory; etc. In all cases, you always have that thing or things for which there can be no further explanation; they simply are. Now, notice that most ontological primitives under materialism are invisible, abstract entities: nobody has ever seen a hyper-dimensional brane itself, or a superstring, or even a fundamental subatomic particle (we only observe the results of their supposed decay as indirect statistical measurements on a computer screen). The problem is that, after granting reality to abstract entities ('convenient fictions,' as anti-realist philosophers call them), we are faced with the challenge of having to explain the most concrete and undeniable aspect of existence – our consciousness – in terms of these convenient fictions. Our inability to do so is the 'hard problem.' We invent abstract entities and then try to explain ourselves in terms of our own abstractions. The 'hard problem' merely reflects a self-referential confusion of categories that has grown completely out of hand. Decades from now we will look back and wonder, flabbergasted, how we could ever have been so deluded.

In my work – see, for instance, my book Why Materialism Is Baloney – I propose that the obvious thing to do is to take consciousness itself as the ontological primitive. This is right in our faces since birth. Then, we can – and I claim to actually do it in the book – explain every other aspect of reality in terms of excitations of consciousness, which obey certain patterns and regularities amenable to modeling. Under this view, the ground of all reality is an impersonal flow of subjective experiences that I metaphorically describe as a stream, while our personal awareness is simply a localization of this flow — a whirlpool in the stream. It is this localization that leads to the illusion of personal identity. Moreover, it is your body-brain system that is in consciousness, not consciousness in your body-brain system. Think of reality as a collective dream: in a dream, it is your dream character that is in your consciousness, not your consciousness in your dream character. This becomes obvious when you wake up, but isn’t at all obvious while you are dreaming. Furthermore, the body-brain system is merely the image of that process of localization in the stream of consciousness, like a whirlpool is the image of a process of localization in a stream of water. For exactly the same reason that a whirlpool doesn’t generate water, your brain doesn’t generate consciousness. Yet, because the image of a process carries valid information about the process — just like the colors of flames carry valid information about the microscopic view of combustion — brain activity correlates tightly with subjective experience.

For more details of this worldview, I invite you to peruse recent essays in this blog, recent videos in my YouTube channel and, most importantly, my most recent book. It is in the book that the complete case is laid out, and nowhere else.